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Abstract. We study the problem of finding an exact solution to the consensus halving problem.
While recent work has shown that the approximate version of this problem is PPA-complete [28,27],
we show that the exact version is much harder. Specifically, finding a solution with n cuts is FIXP-
hard, and deciding whether there exists a solution with fewer than n cuts is ETR-complete. We also
give a QPTAS for the case where each agent’s valuation is a polynomial.
Along the way, we define a new complexity class BU, which captures all problems that can be reduced
to solving an instance of the Borsuk-Ulam problem exactly. We show that FIXP ⊆ BU ⊆ TFETR and
that LinearBU = PPA, where LinearBU is the subclass of BU in which the Borsuk-Ulam instance is
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1 Introduction
Dividing resources among agents in a fair manner is among the most fundamental problems in multi-agent
systems [16]. Cake cutting [6,8,7,15], and rent division [14,32,24] are prominent examples of problems that
lie in this category. At their core, each of these problems has a desired solution whose existence is usually
proved via a theorem from algebraic topology such as Brouwer’s fixed point theorem, Sperner’s lemma,
or Kakutani’s fixed point theorem.
In this paper, we focus on a fair-division problem called consensus-halving : an object A represented
by [0, 1] is to be divided into two halves A+ and A−, so that n agents agree that A+ and A− have the
same value. Provided the agents have bounded and continuous valuations over A, this can always be
achieved using at most n cuts, and this fact can be proved via the Borsuk-Ulam theorem from algebraic
topology [45]. The necklace splitting and ham-sandwich problems are two other examples of fair-division
problems for which the existence of a solution can be proved via the Borsuk-Ulam theorem [4,5,38].
Recent work has further refined the complexity status of approximate consensus halving, in which we
seek a division of the object so that every agent agrees that the values of A+ and A− differ by at most
. Since the problem always has a solution, it lies in TFNP, which is the class of function problems in NP
that always have a solution. More recent work has shown that the problem is PPA-complete [28], even
for  that is inverse-polynomial in n [27]. The problem of deciding whether there exists an approximate
solution with k-cuts when k < n is NP-complete [26]. These results are particularly notable, because they
identify consensus halving as one of the first natural PPA-complete problems.
While previous work has focused on approximate solutions to the problem, in this paper we study
the complexity of solving the problem exactly. For problems in the complexity class PPAD, which is a
subclass of both TFNP and PPA, prior work has found that there is a sharp contrast between exact and
approximate solutions. For example, the Brouwer fixed point theorem is the theorem from algebraic
topology that underpins PPAD. Finding an approximate Brouwer fixed point is PPAD-complete [38], but
finding an exact Brouwer fixed point is complete for (and the defining problem of) a complexity class
called FIXP [25].
It is believed that FIXP is significantly harder than PPAD. While PPAD ⊆ TFNP ⊆ FNP, there is significant
doubt about whether FIXP ⊆ FNP. The reason for this is that there are Brouwer instances for which all
solutions are irrational. This is not particularly relevant when we seek an approximate solution, but is
a major difficulty when we seek an exact solution. For example, the square-root-sum problem asks us
to decide for integers a1, a2, . . . , an, t, whether
∑n
i=1
√
ai ≤ t. This deceptively simple problem is not
known to lie in NP, and can be reduced to the problem of finding an exact Brouwer fixed point [25], which
provides evidence that FIXP may be significantly harder than FNP.
Our contribution In this paper, we study the complexity of solving the consensus halving problem exactly.
In our formulation of the problem, the valuation function of the agents is presented as an arbitrary
arithmetic circuit, and the task is to cut A such that all agents agree that A+ and A− have exactly the
same valuation. We study two problems. The (n, n)-Consensus Halving problem asks us to find an
exact solution for n-agents using at most n-cuts, while the (n, k)-Consensus Halving problem asks us
to decide whether there exists an exact solution for n-agents using at most k-cuts, where k < n.
Our results for (n, n)-Consensus Halving are intertwined with a new complexity class that we call
BU. This class consists of all problems that can be reduced in polynomial time to the problem of finding
a solution of the Borsuk-Ulam problem. We show that (n, n)-Consensus Halving lies in BU, and is
FIXP hard. The hardness for FIXP implies that the exact variant of consensus halving is significantly
harder than the approximate variant: while the approximate problem is PPA-complete, the exact variant
is unlikely to be in FNP.
We show that (n, k)-Consensus Halving is ETR-complete. The complexity class ETR consists of
all decision problems that can be formulated in the existential theory of the reals. It is known that
NP ⊆ ETR ⊆ PSPACE [17], and it is generally believed that ETR is distinct from the other two classes.
So our result again shows that the exact version of the problem seems to be much harder than the
approximate version, which is NP-complete [26].
Just as FIXP can be thought of as the exact analogue of PPAD, we believe that BU is the exact analogue
of PPA, and we provide some evidence to justify this. It has been shown that LinearFIXP = PPAD [25],
which is the version of the class in which arithmetic circuits are restricted to produce piecewise linear
functions (FIXP allows circuits to compute piecewise polynomials). We likewise define LinearBU, which
consists of all problems that can be reduced to a solution of a Borsuk-Ulam problem using a piecewise
linear function, and we show that LinearBU = PPA.
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The containment LinearBU ⊆ PPA can be proved using similar techniques to the proof that
LinearFIXP ⊆ PPAD. However, the proof that PPA ⊆ LinearBU utilises our BU containment result for
consensus halving. In particular, when the input to the consensus halving problem is a piecewise linear
function, our containment result shows that the problem actually lies in LinearBU. The PPA-hardness
results for consensus halving show that piecewise-linear-consensus halving is PPA-hard, which completes
the containment [28,27].
Finally, we show that, for the case where each agent has a (non-piecewise) polynomial valuation, an
approximate solution to the problem can be found using O(log n) cuts, which then yields a QPTAS for
the problem.
Related work Although for a long period there were a few results about PPA, recently there has been
a flourish of PPA-completeness results. The first PPA-completeness result was given by [31] who showed
PPA-completeness of the Sperner problem for a non-orientable 3-dimensional space. In [29] this result
was strengthened for a non-orientable and locally 2-dimensional space. In [3], 2-dimensional Tucker was
shown to be PPA-complete; this result was used in [28,27] to prove PPA-completeness for approximate
consensus halving. In [22] PPA-completeness was proven for a special version of Tucker and for problems
of the form “given a discrete fixed point in a non-orientable space, find another one”. Finally, in [23] it was
shown that octahedral Tucker is PPA-complete. In [36], a subclass of 2DLinearFIXP ⊆ FIXP that consists
of 2-dimensional fixed-point problems was studied, and it was proven that 2DLinearFIXP = PPAD.
A large number of problems are now known to be ETR-complete: geometric intersection prob-
lems [34,40], graph-drawing problems [1,9,18,41], matrix factorization problems [43,44], the Art Gallery
problem [2], and deciding the existence of constrained (symmetric) Nash equilibria in (symmetric) normal
form games with at least three players [10,11,12,13,30].
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Arithmetic circuits
An arithmetic circuit is a representation of a continuous function f : Rn → Rm. The circuit is defined
by a pair (V, T ), where V is a set of nodes and T is a set of gates. There are n nodes in V that are
designated to be input nodes, and m nodes in V that are designated to be output nodes. When a value
x ∈ Rn is presented at the input nodes, the circuit computes values for all other nodes v ∈ V , which we
will denote as x[v]. The values of x[v] for the m output nodes determine the value of f(x) ∈ Rm.
Every node in V , other than the input nodes, is required to be the output of exactly one gate in T . Each
gate g ∈ T enforces an arithmetic constraint on its output node, based on the values of some other node in
the circuit. Cycles are not allowed in these constraints. We allow the operations {ζ,+,−, ∗ζ, ∗,max,min},
which correspond to the gates shown in Table 1. Note that every gate computes a continuous function
over its inputs, and thus any function f that is represented by an arithmetic circuit of this form is also
continuous.
Gate Constraint
Gζ(ζ, vout) x[vout] = ζ, where ζ ∈ Q
G+(vin1, vin2, vout) x[vout] = x[vin1] + x[vin2]
G−(vin1, vin2, vout) x[vout] = x[vin1]− x[vin2]
G∗ζ(ζ, vin, vout) x[vout] = x[vin1] · ζ, where ζ ∈ Q
G∗(vin1, vin2, vout) x[vout] = x[vin1] · x[vin2]
Gmax(vin1, vin2, vout) x[vout] = max{x[vin1], x[vin2]}
Gmin(vin1, vin2, vout) x[vout] = min{x[vin1], x[vin2]}
Table 1. The types of gates and their constraints.
We study two types of circuits in this paper. General arithmetic circuits are allowed to use
any of the gates that we have defined above. Linear arithmetic circuits allow only the operations
{ζ,+,−, ∗ζ,max,min}, and the ∗ operation (multiplication of two variables) is disallowed. Observe that
a linear arithmetic circuit computes a piecewise linear function.
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2.2 The Consensus Halving problem
In the consensus halving problem there is an object A that is represented by the [0, 1] line segment, and
there are n agents. We wish to divide A into two (not necessarily contiguous) pieces such that every agent
agrees that the two pieces have equal value. Simmons and Su [45] have shown that, provided the agents
have bounded and continuous valuations over A, then we can find a solution to this problem using at
most n cuts.
In this paper we consider instances of the consensus halving problem where the valuations of the
agents are presented as arithmetic circuits. Each agent has a valuation function fi : [0, 1] → R, but it is
technically more convenient if they give us a representation of the integral of this function. So for each
agent i, we are given an arithmetic circuit computing Fi : [0, 1] → R where for all x ∈ [0, 1] we have
Fi(x) =
∫ x
0
f(y) dy. Then, the value of any particular segment of [a, b] to agent i can be computed as
Fi(b)− Fi(a).
A solution to the consensus halving problem is given by a k-cut of the object A, which is defined by
a vector of cut-points (t1, t2, . . . , tk) ∈ [0, 1]k, and a vector of signs (s1, s2, . . . , sk+1) ∈ {−1,+1}k+1. The
cut-points ti split A into up to k + 1 pieces. Note that they may in fact split A into fewer than k + 1
pieces in the case where two cut-points ti = tj overlap. We define Xi to be the ith piece of A, meaning
that X0 = [0, t1], Xi = [ti, ti+1] for all i in the range 1 ≤ i < k, and Xk = [tk, 1].
The sign vector determines which half of A the piece belongs to. We define A+ := {Xi : si = +1}
and A− := {Xi : si = −1} to be the two halves. For each agent i, we denote the value A+ to agent i as
Fi(A+) :=
∑
[a,b]∈A+ (Fi(b)− Fi(a)), and we define Fi(A−) analogously. The k-cut is a solution to the
consensus halving problem if Fi(A+) = Fi(A−) for all agents i.
We define two computational problems. Simmons and Su [45] have proved that there always exists a
solution using at most n-cuts, and our first problem is to find that solution.
(n, n)-Consensus Halving
Input: For every agent i ∈ [n], an arithmetic circuit Fi computing the integral of agent i’s
valuation function.
Task: Find an n-cut for A such that Fi(A+) = Fi(A−), for every agent i ∈ [n].
For k < n a solution to the problem may or may not exist. So we define the following decision variant
of the problem.
(n, k)-Consensus Halving
Input: For every agent i ∈ [n], an arithmetic circuit Fi computing the integral of agent i’s
valuation function.
Task: Decide whether there exists a k-cut for A such that Fi(A+) = Fi(A−), for every agent
i ∈ [n].
For either of these two problems, if all of the inputs are represented by linear arithmetic circuits, then
we refer to the problem as Linear Consensus Halving. We note that the known hardness results [26,28]
for consensus halving fall into this class. Specifically, those results produce valuations that are piecewise
constant, and so the integral of these functions is piecewise linear, and these functions can be written
down as linear arithmetic circuits [37].
3 The Class BU
The Borsuk-Ulam theorem states that every continuous function from the surface of an (d+1)-dimensional
sphere to the d-dimensional Euclidean space maps at least one pair of antipodal points to the same point.
Theorem 1 (Borsuk-Ulam). Let f : Sd → Rd be a continuous function, where Sd is a (d + 1)-
dimensional sphere. Then, there exists an x ∈ Sd such that f(x) = f(−x).
This theorem actually works for any domain D that is antipode-preserving homeomorphism of
Sd, where by “antipode-preserving” we mean that for every x ∈ D we have that −x ∈ D. In
this paper, we choose Sd to be the sphere in d + 1 dimensions with respect to L1 norm: Sd :={
x | x = (x1, x2, . . . , xd+1),
∑d+1
i=1 |xi| = 1
}
.
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We define the Borsuk-Ulam problem as follows.
Borsuk-Ulam
Input: A continuous function f : Rd+1 → Rd presented as an arithmetic circuit.
Task: Find an x ∈ Sd such that f(x) = f(−x) and ∑d+1i=1 |xi|.
Note that we cannot constrain an arithmetic circuit to only take inputs from the domain Sd, so we
instead put the constraint that x ∈ Sd onto the solution.
The complexity class BU is defined as follows.
Definition 2 (BU). The complexity class BU consists of all search problems that can be reduced to
Borsuk-Ulam in polynomial time.
3.1 LinearBU
When the input to a Borsuk-Ulam instance is a linear arithmetic circuit, then we call the problem
Linear Borsuk-Ulam, and we define the class LinearBU as follows.
Definition 3 (LinearBU). The complexity class LinearBU consists of all search problems that can be
reduced to Linear Borsuk-Ulam in polynomial time.
We will show that LinearBU = PPA. The proof that LinearBU ⊆ PPA is similar to the proof that
Etessami and Yannakakis used to show that LinearFIXP ⊆ PPAD [25], while the fact that PPA ⊆ LinearBU
will follow from our results on consensus halving in Section 4.
To prove LinearBU ⊆ PPA we will reduce to the approximate Borsuk-Ulam problem. It is well known
that the Borsuk-Ulam theorem can be proved via Tucker’s lemma, and Papadimitriou noted that this
implies that finding an approximate solution to a Borsuk-Ulam problem lies in PPA [38]. This is indeed
correct, but the proof provided in [38] is for a slightly different problem3. Since our results will depend
on this fact, we provide our own definition and self-contained proof here. We define the approximate
Borsuk-Ulam problem as follows.
-Borsuk-Ulam
Input: A continuous function f : Rd+1 → Rd presented as an arithmetic circuit, along with two
constants , λ ∈ R.
Task: Find one of the following.
1. A point x ∈ Sd such that ‖f(x)− f(−x)‖∞ ≤  and
∑d+1
i=1 |xi|.
2. Two points x, y ∈ Sd such that ‖f(x)− f(y)‖∞ > λ · ‖x− y‖∞.
The first type of solution is an approximate solution to the Borsuk-Ulam problem, while the second
type of solution consists of any two points that witness that the function is not λ-Lipschitz continuous in
the L∞-norm. The second type of solution is necessary, because an arithmetic circuit is capable, through
repeated squaring, of computing doubly-exponentially large numbers, and the reduction to Tucker may
not be able to find an approximate solution for such circuits. We now re-prove the result of Papadimitriou
in the following lemma.
Lemma 4 ([38]). -Borsuk-Ulam is in PPA.
To show that LinearBU ⊆ PPA we will provide a polynomial time reduction from
Linear Borsuk-Ulam to -Borsuk-Ulam. To do this, we follow closely the technique used by Etes-
sami and Yannakakis to show that LinearFIXP ⊆ PPAD [25]. The idea is to make a single call to
-Borsuk-Ulam to find an approximate solution to the problem for a suitably small , and to then
round to an exact solution by solving a linear program. To build the LP, we depend on the fact that we
have access to the linear arithmetic circuit that represents f .
Lemma 5. Linear Borsuk-Ulam is in PPA
The proofs of these two lemmata can be found in Appendix A and B respectively.
3 The problem used in [38] presents the function as a polynomial-time Turing machine rather than an arithmetic
circuit, and the Lipschitzness of the function is guaranteed by constraining the values that it can take.
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4 Containment Results for Consensus Halving
4.1 (n, n)-Consensus Halving is in BU and LinearBU = PPA
We show that (n, n)-Consensus Halving is contained in BU. Simmons and Su [45] show the existence of
an n-cut solution to the consensus halving problem by applying the Borsuk-Ulam theorem, and we follow
their approach in this reduction. However, we must show that the approach can be implemented using
arithmetic circuits. We take care in the reduction to avoid G∗ gates, and so if the inputs to the problem
are all linear arithmetic circuits, then our reduction will produce a Linear Borsuk-Ulam instance.
Hence, we also show that (n, n)-Linear Consensus Halving is in LinearBU. The proof can be found
in Appendix C.
Theorem 6. The following two containments hold.
– (n, n)-Consensus Halving is in BU.
– (n, n)-Linear Consensus Halving is in LinearBU.
We note that this also implies that PPA ⊆ LinearBU, thereby completing the proof that
PPA = LinearBU. Specifically, Filos-Ratsikas and Goldberg have shown that approximate-(n, n)-
Consensus Halving is PPA-complete, and their valuation functions are piecewise constant. There-
fore, the integrals of these functions are piecewise linear, and so their approximate-(n, n)-
Consensus Halving instances can be reduced to (n, n)-Linear Consensus Halving. Hence (n, n)-
Linear Consensus Halving is PPA-hard, which along with Lemma 5 implies the following corollary.
Corollary 7. PPA = LinearBU.
4.2 (n, k)-Consensus Halving is in ETR
The existential theory of the reals consists of all true existentially quantified formulae using the connec-
tives {∧,∨,¬} over polynomials compared with the operators {<,≤,=,≥, >}. The complexity class ETR
captures all problems that can be reduced in polynomial time to the existential theory of the reals.
We prove that (n, k)-Consensus Halving is in ETR. The reduction simply encodes the arithmetic
circuits using ETR formulas, and then constrains Fi(A+) = Fi(A−) for every agent i. The proof can be
found in Appendix D.
Theorem 8. (n, k)-Consensus Halving is in ETR.
Using the same technique, we can also reduce Borsuk-Ulam to an ETR formula. In this case, we get
an ETR formula that always has a solution, and so this result places the problem in TFETR, which is the
subclass of ETR in which the formula is guaranteed to be true.
Theorem 9. BU ⊆ TFETR.
5 Hardness Results for Consensus Halving
In this section we prove that (n, n)-Consensus Halving is FIXP-hard and that (n, n − 1)-
Consensus Halving is ETR-hard. These two reductions share a common step of embedding an arithmetic
circuit into a consensus halving instance. So we first describe this step, and then move on to proving the
two individual hardness results.
5.1 Embedding a circuit in a Consensus Halving instance
Our approach is inspired by [26], who provided a reduction from -GCircuit [19,39] to approximate
consensus halving. However, our construction deviates significantly from theirs due to several reasons.
Firstly, the reduction in [26] works only for approximate consensus halving. Specifically, some valu-
ations used in that construction have the form of 1/, where  is the approximation guarantee, so the
construction is not well-defined when  = 0 as it is in our case. Many of the gate gadgets used in [26]
cannot be used due to this issue, including the max gate, which is crucially used in that construction to
ensure that intermediate values do not get too large. We provide our own implementations of the broken
gates. Our gate gadgets only work when the inputs and outputs lie in the range [0, 1], and so we must
carefully construct circuits for which this is always the case. The second major difference is that the
reduction in [26] does not provide any method of multiplying two variables, which is needed in our case.
We construct a gadget to do this, based on a more primitive gadget for squaring a single variable.
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Special circuit Our reduction from an arithmetic circuit to consensus halving will use a very particular
subset of gates. Specifically, we will not use Gmin, Gmax, or G∗, and we will restrict G∗ζ so that ζ must
lie in (0, 1]. We do however introduce three new gates, shown in Table 2. The gate G()2 squares its input,
the gate G[0,1]∗2 multiplies its input by two, but requires that the input be in [0, 1/2], and the gate G
[0,1]
−
is a special minus gate that takes as inputs a, b ∈ [0, 1] and outputs max{a− b, 0}.
Special Gate Constraint Ranges
G()2(vin, vout) x[vout] = (x[vin])
2 x[vin] ∈ [0, 1]
G
[0,1]
∗2 (vin, vout) x[vout] = x[vin] · 2 x[vin] ∈ [0, 1/2]
G
[0,1]
− (vin1, vin2, vout) x[vout] = max{x[vin1]− x[vin2], 0} x[vin1], x[vin2] ∈ [0, 1]
Table 2. The special types of gates, their constraints and ranges of input.
We note that Gmin, Gmax, and G∗ can be implemented in terms of our new gates according to the
following identities.
max{a, b} = a+ b
2
+
|a− b|
2
=
a
2
+
b
2
+
1
2
max{a− b, 0}+ 1
2
max{a− b, 0},
min{a, b} = a+ b
2
− |a− b|
2
=
a
2
+
b
2
− 1
2
max{a− b, 0} − 1
2
max{a− b, 0},
a · b = 2
[(
a
2
+
b
2
)2
−
((a
2
)2
+
(
b
2
)2)]
.
Also, a very important requirement of the special circuit is that both inputs of any G+ gate are in
[0, 1/2]. To make sure of that, we downscale the inputs before reaching the gate, and upscale the output,
using the fact that a+ b = (a/2 + b/2) · 2.
The reduction to consensus halving The reduction follows the general outline of the reduction given
in [26]. The construction is quite involved, and so we focus on the high-level picture here.
Each gate is implemented by 4 agents, namely ad,mid, cen, ex in the consensus halving instance. The
values computed by the gates are encoded by the positions of the cuts that are required in order to satisfy
these agents. Agent ad performs the exact mathematical operation of the gate, and feeds the outcome
in mid, who “trims” it in accordance with the gate’s actual operation. Then mid feeds her outcome to
cen and ex, who make a copy of mid’s correct value of the gate, with “negative” and “positive” labels
respectively. This value with the appropriate label will be input to other gates.
The most important agents are the ones that perform the mathematical operation of each gate, i.e.
agents ad. Figure 1 shows the part of the valuation functions of these agents that perform the operation.
Each figure shows a valuation function for one of the agents, meaning that the blue regions represent
portions of the object that the agent desires. The agent’s valuation function for any particular interval is
the integral of this function over that interval.
To understand the high-level picture of the construction, let us look at the construction for G∗ζ . The
precise valuation functions of the agents in the construction (see (1) in Appendix F.1) ensure that there
is exactly one input cut in the region v+in. The leftmost piece due to that cut in that region will belong to
A+, while the rightmost will belong to A−. It is also ensured that there is exactly one output cut in the
region vaout, and that the first piece in that region will belong to A− and the second will belong to A+.
Suppose that gate gi in the circuit is of type G∗ζ and we want to implement it through a
Consensus Halving instance. If we treat v+in and v
a
out in Figure 1 as representing [0, 1], then agent
adi will take as input a cut at point x ∈ v+in. In order to be satisfied, adi will impose a cut at point
y ∈ vaout, such that Fi(A+) = Fi(A−), where: Fi(A+) = x+(ζ−y)/ζ and Fi(A−) = (1−x)+y/ζ. Simple
algebraic manipulation can be used to show that adi is satisfied only when y = ζ · x, as required.
We show that the same property holds for each of the gates in Figure 1. Two notable constructions
are for the gates G()2 and G
[0,1]
− . For the gate G()2 the valuation function of agent ad is non-constant,
which is needed to implement the non-linear squaring function. For the gate G[0,1]− , note that the output
region vaout only covers half of the possible output space. The idea is that if the result of x[vin1]−x[vin2] is
negative, then the output cut will lie before the output region, which will be interpreted as a zero output
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Valuation function
1 if t ∈ [vaout,l + ζ − 12, vaout,l + ζ + 12]
0 otherwise
1 if t ∈ v+in
0 otherwise
1/ζ if t ∈ [vaout,l, vaout,l + ζ ]
2(t− v+in,l) if t ∈ v+in
0 otherwise
1 if t ∈ vaout
1 if t ∈ [v+in2,l, v+in2,l + 12]
0 otherwise
1 if t ∈ vaout
1 if t ∈ [v+in1,l, v+in1,l + 12]
Gpi(t)
1 if t ∈ [v+in,l, v+in,l + 12]
0 otherwise
1/2 if t ∈ vaout
1 if t ∈ v−in2
0 otherwise
1 if t ∈ [vaout,l − 1, vaout,r]
1 if t ∈ v+in1
1
vaout
vaoutv
+
in
vaoutv
+
in2v
+
in1
vaoutv
+
in
v+in
vaoutv
−
in2v
+
in1
vaout
1
1
ζ
ζ
11 1
1 1 1
1
2
1
Gate
Gζ
G∗ζ
G+
G()2
G
[0,1]
∗2
1
2
1
2
1
2
1
2
1
2
1
2
1
ζ
G
[0,1]
−
Fig. 1. Gates and their corresponding functions Gpi(t).
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v+j v
−
k v
a
i v
m
i v
−
i v
+
i· · · · · ·
adi
midi
ceni
exi
Fig. 2. An example where the computation at the output vout := vi of a G[0,1]− gate with inputs vin1 := vj and
vin2 := vk is simulated by the Consensus Halving instance. Here x[vj ] = 1/4 and x[vk] = 3/4, hence x[vi] = 0.
The information about the values of the inputs is encoded by the cuts (red lines) in intervals v+j , and v
−
k imposed
by agents exj and cenk respectively. The blue and green shapes depict the area below the valuation function of
each of the 4 agents. The pink regions have label “+” while the yellow have label “−”. Agent adi performs the
subtraction, by demanding that she is satisfied, and places a cut 1/10 to the left of the left endpoint of interval
vai . Then agent midi gets satisfied by placing a cut at exactly the left endpoint of interval vmi , thus encoding the
value 0 which is the correct output value of the gate. Finally, agents ceni, exi copy this value by enforcing similar
cuts at the left endpoints of intervals v−i and v
+
i respectively. The encoded values in the latter two intervals are
the “negative” and “positive” version of x[vi].
by agents mid, cen, ex in the construction. On the other hand, if the result is positive, the result will lie
in the usual output range, and will be interpreted as a positive number. An example where x[vin1] = 1/4
and x[vin2] = 3/4 is shown in Figure 2.
Ultimately, this allows us to construct a consensus-halving instance that implements this circuit. This
means that for any x ∈ [0, 1]n, we can encode x as a set of cuts, which then force cuts to be made at each
gate gadget that encode the correct output for that gate. The full details of the construction are quite
involved, and so we defer them to Appendix F, where the following result is shown.
Lemma 10. Suppose that we are given an arithmetic circuit with the following properties.
– The circuit uses the gates Gζ , G+, G∗ζ , G()2 , G
[0,1]
− , G
[0,1]
∗2 .
– Every Gζ and G∗ζ has ζ ∈ Q ∩ (0, 1].
– For every input x ∈ [0, 1]n, all intermediate values computed by the circuit lie in [0, 1].
We can construct a consensus-halving instance that implements this circuit.
5.2 (n, n)-Consensus Halving is FIXP-hard
We show that (n, n)-Consensus Halving is FIXP-hard by reducing from the problem of finding a Nash
equilibrium in a d-player game, which is known to be a FIXP-complete [25]. As shown in [25], this problem
can be reduced to the Brouwer fixed point problem: given an arithmetic circuit computing a function
F : [0, 1]n → [0, 1]n, find a point x ∈ [0, 1]n such that F (x) = x. In a similar way to [26], we take this
circuit and embed it into a consensus halving instance, with the outputs looped back to the inputs. Since
Lemma 10 implies that our implementation of the circuit is correct, this means that any solution to the
consensus halving problem must encode a point x satisfying F (x) = x.
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One difficulty is that we must ensure that the arithmetic circuit that we build falls into the class
permitted by Lemma 10. To do this, we carefully analyse the circuits produced in [25], and we modify
them so that all of the preconditions of Lemma 10 hold. This gives us the following result, which is proved
in Appendix G.
Theorem 11. (n, n)-Consensus Halving is FIXP-hard.
This theorem, along with Theorem 6 give the following corollary.
Corollary 12. FIXP ⊆ BU.
5.3 (n, n− 1)-Consensus Halving is ETR-complete
We will show the ETR-hardness of (n, n−1)-Consensus Halving by reducing from the following problem
Feasible, which is known to be ETR-complete [42].
Definition 13 (Feasible, Feasible[0,1]). Let p(x1, . . . , xm) be a polynomial. Feasible asks whether
there exists a point (x1, . . . , xm) ∈ Rm that satisfies p(x1, . . . , xm) = 0. Feasible[0,1] asks whether there
exists a point (x1, . . . , xm) ∈ [0, 1]n that satisfies p.
The idea is to turn the polynomial into a circuit, and then embed that circuit into a consensus halving
instance using Lemma 10. As before, the main difficulty is ensuring that the preconditions of Lemma 10
are satisfied. To do this, we must ensure that the the inputs to the circuit take values in [0, 1], which is
not the case if we reduce directly from Feasible. Instead, we first consider the problem Feasible[0,1],
in which x is constrained to lie in [0, 1]n rather than Rn, and we show the following result in Appendix
H.2.
Lemma 14. Feasible[0,1] is ETR-complete.
ETR[0,1] is the subclass of ETR in which variables are quantified over [0, 1]n rather than Rn. The above
lemma follows from the fact that ETR[0,1] = ETR which we prove in Appendix H.1, and the fact that
Feasible[0,1] is ETR[0,1]-hard which we prove in Appendix H.2. This equivalence of classes, together with
the completeness of Feasible[0,1] may be of independent interest.
We then proceed to reduce Feasible[0,1] to (n, n−1)-Consensus Halving. We still don’t quite meet
the requirements of Lemma 10, because the intermediate terms may be outside [0, 1]. We resolve this by
implementing a circuit p+(x) (called q1(x) in Appendix I) implementing only the positive terms of p(x)
downscaled appropriately, and a circuit p−(x) (called q2(x) in Appendix I) implementing the positive
terms of −p(x) again downscaled appropriately. The check agent is then satisfied if p+(x) = p−(x), which
can only occur when p(x) = 0.
There will be n− 1 choice agents (the agents called ad,mid, cen, ex in Appendix F.1 with valuation
functions shown in (1)) corresponding to the (n − 1)/4 nodes of the circuit, who enforce that there is a
cut for each of the nodes to the circuit, and together these cuts encode an input x to the polynomial.
Each agent introduced by Lemma 10 has an associated cut that is forced by the construction used in that
lemma, and these cuts compute the output of the associated gate.
So far, every agent has a corresponding cut that is forced by the construction. There is, however, one
final check agent (the agent called finis in Appendix I) with valuation functions shown in (17)) who has
the following properties.
– If p(x) = 0, then the check agent agrees that A has been cut in half without an extra cut being made.
– If p(x) 6= 0, then the check agent requires one more cut to be made in order to be satisfied that A
has been cut in half.
Hence, if there exists a solution to Feasible, then there is a solution to Feasible[0,1], hence there is a
(n− 1)-cut that solves the Consensus Halving instance, and otherwise there is no such solution. The
details of this reduction are given in Appendix I, where the following result is shown.
Theorem 15. (n, n− 1)-Consensus Halving is ETR-complete.
6 A QPTAS for Consensus Halving with polynomial valuation functions
In this section we show that an approximate solution to the consensus halving problem can be found
in quasi-polynomial time when each agent’s valuation function is presented as a single polynomial of
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constant or logarithmic degree. We will do so by formulating the problem as a formula in the approximate
existential theory of the reals, and then applying the approximation theorem proved in [20,21].
Our result implies that these instances can be solved approximately using a logarithmic number of
cuts. We note that this is one of the most general classes of instances for which we could hope to prove
such a result: any instance in which n agents desire completely disjoint portions of the object can only
be solved by an n-cut, and piecewise linear functions are capable of producing such a situation. So in a
sense, we are exploiting the fact that this situation cannot arise when the agents have (non-piecewise)
polynomial valuations. The proof of the following lemma can be found in Appendix J.
Lemma 16. For every Consensus Halving instance with n agents, and every  > 0, if each agent’s
valuation function Fi is represented as a single polynomial of degree at most O(log n), then there exists
an O(log n)-cut and pieces A+ and A− such that:
– every cut point is a multiple of 1/k = 
4
O(logn) ;
– |Fi(A+)− Fi(A−)| ≤ , for every agent i.
As a consequence, we can perform a brute force search over all possible O(log n)-cuts to find an
approximate solution, which can be carried out in nO(logn/
4) time.
Theorem 17. Consensus Halving admits a QPTAS when the valuation function of every agent is a
single polynomial of degree O(log n).
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A Proof of Lemma 4
Proof. This proof is essentially identical to the one given by Papadimitriou, but various minor changes
must be made due to the fact that our input is an arithmetic circuit, and our domain is the L1-sphere.
His proof works by reducing to the Tucker problem. In this problem we have a antipodally symmetric
triangulation of Sd with set of vertices V , and a labelling function L : V → {−1, 1,−2, 2, . . . ,−d, d}
that satisfies L(v) = −L(−v) for all v ∈ V . The task is to find two adjacent vertices v and u such that
L(v) = −L(u), whose existence is guaranteed via Tucker’s lemma. Papadimitriou’s containment proof
goes via the hypercube, but in [26] it is pointed out that this problem also lies in PPA when the domain
is the L1-sphere Sd.
To reduce the -Borsuk-Ulam problem for (f, , λ) to Tucker, we choose an arbitrary triangulation
of Sn such that the distance between any two adjacent vertices is at most /λ. Let g(x) = f(x)− f(−x).
To determine the label of a vertex v ∈ V , first find the coordinate i that maximises |g(v)i| breaking ties
arbitrarily, and then set L(v) = i if g(v)i > 0 and L(v) = −i otherwise.
Tucker’s lemma will give us two adjacent vertices v and u satisfying L(v) = −L(u), and we must
translate this to a solution to -Borsuk-Ulam. If ‖g(u) − g(v)‖∞ > λ · ‖u − v‖∞, then we have a
violation of Lipschitz continuity. Otherwise, we have
‖g(u)− g(v)‖∞ ≤ λ · ‖u− v‖∞
≤ λ · 
λ
≤ 
Let i = L(v). Note that by definition we have that |g(v)j | ≤ |g(v)i| for all j, that |g(u)j | ≤ |g(u)i|
for all j, and that that g(u)i and g(v)i have opposite signs. These three facts, along with the fact that
‖g(u) − g(v)‖∞ ≤  imply that |g(v)j | ≤  for all j. Hence we can conclude that ‖f(v) − f(−v)‖∞ ≤ 
meaning that v is a solution to -Borsuk-Ulam. uunionsq
B Proof of Lemma 5
Proof. Suppose that we have a function f that is represented as a linear arithmetic circuit. We will
provide a polynomial time reduction to -Borsuk-Ulam.
The first step is to argue that, for all  > 0, we can make a single call to -Borsuk-Ulam in order to
find an -approximate solution to the problem. The only technicality here is that we must choose λ so as
to ensure that no violations of λ-Lipschitzness in the L∞-norm can be produced as a solution.
Fortunately, every linear arithmetic circuit computes a λ-Lipschitz function where the bit-length of
λ is polynomial in the size of the circuit. Moreover, an upper bound on λ can easily be computed by
inspecting the circuit.
– An input to the circuit has a Lipschitz constant of 1.
– A + gate operating on two gates with Lipschitz constants x and y has a Lipschitz constant of at most
x+ y.
– A ∗ζ gate operating on a gate with Lipschitz constant x has a Lipschitz constant of at most |ζ| · x.
– A max or min gate operating on two gates with Lipschitz constants x and y has a Lipschitz constant
of at most max(x, y).
The Lipschitz constant for the circuit in the L∞-norm is then the maximum of the Lipschitz constants
of the output nodes of the circuit. So, for any given  > 0 that can be represented in polynomially many
bits, we can make a single call to -Borsuk-Ulam, in order to find an -approximate solution to the
Borsuk-Ulam problem.
The second step is to choose an appropriate value for  so that the approximate solution can be
rounded to an exact solution using an LP. Let g(x) = f(x)−f(−x). Note that g(x) can also be computed
by a linear arithmetic circuit, and that g(x) = 0 if and only if f(x) = f(−x).
We closely follow the approach of Etessami and Yannakakis [25]. They use the fact that the function
computed by a linear arithmetic circuit is piecewise-linear, and defined by (potentially exponentially
many) hyperplanes. They give an algorithm that, given a point p in the domain of the circuit, computes
in polynomial time the hyperplane that defines the output of the circuit for p. Furthermore, they show
that the following can be produced in polynomial time from the representation of the circuit and from p.
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– A system of linear constraints Ax ≤ b such that a point x satisfies the constraints if and only if the
hyperplane that defines the output of the circuit for p also defines the output of the circuit for x.
– A linear formula Cx+C ′ that determines the output of the circuit for all points that satisfy Ax ≤ b.
To choose , the following procedure is used. Let n be the number of inputs to g, and letm be an upper
bound on the bit-size of the solution of any linear system with n+ 1 equations where the coefficients are
drawn from the hyperplanes that define the function computed by g. This can be computed in polynomial
time from the description of the circuit, and m will have polynomial size in relation to the description of
the circuit. We choose  < 1/2m.
We make one call to -Borsuk-Ulam to find a point p ∈ Sn such that ‖f(p)−f(−p)‖∞ ≤ , meaning
that ‖g(p)‖∞ ≤ . The final step is to round this to an exact solution of Borsuk-Ulam. To do this, we
can modify the linear program used by Etessami and Yannakakis [25]. We apply the operations given
above to the circuit g and the point p to obtain the system of constraints Ax ≤ b and the formula
Cx + C ′ for the hyperplane defining the output of g for p. We then solve the following linear program.
The variables of the LP are a vector x of length n, and a scalar z. The goal is to minimize z subject to:
Ax ≤ b
(Cx)i + C
′
i ≤ z for i = 1, . . . , n
−((Cx)i + C ′i) ≤ z for i = 1, . . . , n
xi ≥ 0 for each i with pi ≥ 0
xi < 0 for each i with pi < 0
n∑
i=1
|xi| = 1 (see below regarding |xi|)
The first constraint ensures that we remain on the same hyperplane as the one defining the output of g
for p. The second and third constraints ensure that ‖g(x)‖∞ ≤ z. The fourth and fifth constraints ensure
that xi has the same sign as pi, while the sixth constraint ensures that x lies on the surface Sn. Note that
the |xi| operation in the sixth constraint is not a problem, since the fourth and fifth constraints mean
that we know the sign of xi up front, and so we just need to add either xi or −xi to the sum. All of the
above implies that that x is a z-approximate solution of Borsuk-Ulam for f .
We must now argue that the solution sets z = 0. First we note that the LP has a solution, because the
point (p, ) is feasible, and the LP is not unbounded since z cannot be less than zero due to the second
and third constraints. So let (x∗, z∗) be an optimal solution. This solution lies at the intersection of n+1
linear constraints defined by rationals drawn from the circuit representing g, and so it follows that z∗ is
a rational of bit length at most m. Since 0 ≤ z∗ ≤  < 1/2m, it follows that z∗ = 0, and thus x∗ is an
exact solution to Borsuk-Ulam for f . uunionsq
C Proof of Theorem 6
Proof. Let us first summarise the approach used by Simmons and Su [45]. Given valuation functions
Fi for the n agents, they construct a Borsuk-Ulam instance given by a function b : Sn → Rn. Each
point (x1, x2, . . . , xn+1) ∈ Sn can be interpreted as an n-cut of [0, 1], where |xi| gives the width of the
ith piece, and the sign of xi indicates whether the ith piece should belong in A+ or A−. They then
define b(x)i = Fi(A+) for each agent i. The fact that −x flips the sign of each piece, but not the
width, implies that b(−x)i = Fi(A−). Hence, any point that satisfies b(x) = b(−x) has the property that
Fi(A+) = Fi(A−) for all agents i, and so is a solution to the consensus halving property.
Our task is to implement this reduction using arithmetic circuits. Suppose that we are given arithmetic
circuits Fi implementing the integral of each agent’s valuation function. Given a point (x1, x2, . . . , xn+1) ∈
Sn, we show that b(x)i = Fi(A+) can be computed via a linear arithmetic circuit. The tricky part of this,
is that we must only include the ith piece in the sum if xi is positive.
We begin by observing that the operation of |x| can be implemented via a linear arithmetic circuit.
Specifically, via the following construction:
|x| := max(x, 0) + max(−x, 0).
Hence, we can implement |x| using only max, plus, and constant gates. Then, we define t1 := 0, and for
each j in the range 2 ≤ j ≤ n, define:
tj := tj−1 + |xk|.
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The value of tj gives the start of the jth piece. Next, for each j in the range 1 ≤ j ≤ n we define:
pj := max(xj , 0).
Note that pj is xj whenever xj is positive, and zero otherwise. Finally, define:
qj := Fi(tj + pj)− Fi(tj).
Using the reasoning above, we can see that qj is agent i’s valuation for piece j whenever xj is positive,
and zero otherwise. So we can define
b(x)i =
n∑
j=1
qj ,
implying that b(x)i = Fi(A+), as required.
To complete the proof, it suffices to note that none of the operations specified above use the gate
G∗, and so if each Fi is specified by a linear arithmetic circuit, then b will also be a linear arithmetic
circuit. uunionsq
D Proof of Theorem 8
Proof. The first step is to argue that an arithmetic circuit can be implemented as an ETR formula.
Let (V, T ) be the arithmetic circuit. For every vertex v ∈ V we introduce a new variable xv. For every
gate g ∈ T we introduce a constraint. For the gates in the set {Gζ , G+, G−, G∗ζ , G∗} the constraints
simply implement the gate directly, eg., for a gate G+(vin1, vin2, vout) we use the constraint x[vout] =
x[vin1] + x[vin2]. For a gate Gmax(vin1, vin2, vout) we use the formula(
(x[vout] = x[vin1]) ∧ (x[vin1] ≥ x[vin2])
) ∨ ((x[vout] = x[vin2]) ∧ (x[vin2] ≥ x[vin1])),
and likewise for a gate Gmin(vin1, vin2, vout) we use the formula(
(x[vout] = x[vin1]) ∧ (x[vin1] ≤ x[vin2])
) ∨ ((x[vout] = x[vin2]) ∧ (x[vin2] ≤ x[vin1])).
Taking the conjunction of the constraints for each of the gates yields an ETR formula that implements
the circuit.
Now we perform the reduction from consensus halving to the existential theory of the reals. Suppose
that we have been given, for each agent i, an arithmetic circuit Fi implementing the integral of agent i’s
valuation function. We have already shown in the proof of Theorem 6 that, given a description of a k-cut
given as a point in Sk, we can create a circuit implementing Fi(A+) and a circuit implementing Fi(A−)
for each agent i. We also argued in that proof that
∑k+1
j=1 |xj | can be implemented as an arithmetic circuit.
Our ETR formula is as follows.
∃x ·
(
n∧
i=1
Fi(A+) = Fi(A−)
)
∧
k+1∑
j=1
|xj | = 1
The first set of constraints ensure that x is a solution to the consensus halving problem, and the final
constraint ensures that x ∈ Sn. uunionsq
E Proof of Theorem 9
Proof. The proof is essentially identical to the proof of Theorem 8, and the only difference is that instead
of starting with a consensus-halving instance, we start with an arbitrary arithmetic circuit representing
the function f : Sd → Rd, for which we wish to find a point x satisfying f(x) = f(−x). We implement
the arithmetic circuit in the same way as in Theorem 8, and our ETR formula is:
∃x ·
(
d∧
i=1
fi(x) = fi(−x)
)
∧
d+1∑
j=1
|xj | = 1.
uunionsq
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F Proof of Lemma 10
F.1 Special circuit to Consensus Halving instance
Consider a circuit H = (V, T ) that uses gates in {Gζ , G+, G∗ζ , G()2 , G[0,1]− , G[0,1]∗2 }, with ζ ∈ Q ∩ (0, 1],
each gate’s inputs/output are in [0, 1], and both inputs of G+ are in [0, 1/2]. The constraints of the special
gates G()2 , G
[0,1]
− , G
[0,1]
∗2 are shown in Table 2.
In general, the input of H is a N -dimensional vector x ∈ [0, 1]N is given by N nodes with in-degree
0 and out-degree 1, called input-nodes. Also, in general, the output of H is a M -dimensional vector
x′ ∈ [0, 1]M (the dimension of the circuit’s output is of no importance here). Moreover, it could be the
case that H is cyclic, meaning that it has no input and no output, but here we will consider the general
case. Without loss of generality, let the rest of the nodes be of in-degree 1 and out-degree 1, located right
after each gate’s output. By “right after” we mean that if a gate’s output has a branching, the node is
placed before the branching. Suppose that the total number of nodes in H is r := N + |T | = poly(N),
since by definition H has polynomial size.
If the node vi ∈ V for i ∈ [r] is at the output of gate gi we will call it the output-node of gi (otherwise
it will be an input-node). For an example see Figure 3.
G+
G∗12G()2
G+
G∗12G()2
v
g g
Fig. 3. Before (leftmost figure) and after (rightmost figure) the creation of a node in series with the output of an
addition gate. v is the output-node of g.
Consider the node vi, the output-node of gate gi. vi corresponds to 4 consensus halving agents, named
adi, midi, ceni and exi. Player adi (Latin for “to”) represents the incoming edge to node vi and agent exi
(Latin for “from”) the outgoing edge from vi, while both midi and ceni represent an edge at the middle
(center) of node vi that connects its input and output. The number of agents created in H is n := 4r.
The domain of the valuation functions of the agents is [0, 12r]. Furthermore, this interval is split to r
blocks, with the i-th block being [bi, bi+1], where bi := 12(i− 1), i ∈ [r].
According to the definition of the Consensus Halving problem, the domain of the valuation func-
tions of the agents is [0, 1]. Although the domain of the valuation functions of the Consensus Halving
instance that we reduce to is [0, 12r], this is just for convenience of presentation. In fact, by scaling
down each block to length 1/(12r) (divide by 12r), the domain becomes [0, 1] and the correctness of the
reduction is preserved.
Let us define the function borderi(t), t ∈ [0, 12r] for each node vi, i ∈ [r]. The idea for this function
is from [26].
borderi(t) =
{
4, t ∈ [bi, bi + 1] ∪ [bi + 2, bi + 3]
0, otherwise
and also:
– vai := [bi + 1, bi + 2] := [vai,l, v
a
i,r]
– vmi := [bi + 4, bi + 5] := [vmi,l, v
m
i,r]
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– v−i := [bi + 7, bi + 8] := [v
−
i,l, v
−
i,r]
– v+i := [bi + 10, bi + 11] := [v
+
i,l, v
+
i,r]
– Gpi(t) is the function corresponding to gate of type Gpi ∈ {Gζ , G∗ζ , G+, G()2 , G[0,1]− , G[0,1]∗2 } (see Figure
1).
The valuation functions of the agents adi, midi, ceni and exi corresponding to node vi are,
adi(t) =
{
borderi(t) +Gpi(t), if vi is the output-node of gate type Gpi
borderi(t), if vi is input-node (input of H).
(1)
midi(t) =

4, t ∈ [bi + 3, bi + 4] ∪ [bi + 5, bi + 6]
1, t ∈ vai ∪ vmi
0, otherwise
ceni(t) =

4, t ∈ [bi + 6, bi + 7] ∪ [bi + 8, bi + 9]
1, t ∈ vmi ∪ v−i
0, otherwise
exi(t) =

4, t ∈ [bi + 9, bi + 10] ∪ [bi + 11, bi + 12]
1, t ∈ v−i ∪ v+i
0, otherwise
The intuition for the synergy of the 4 agents is the following: Take as a given that in a solution of
the created Consensus Halving instance with at most n cuts, a cut is placed only (almost always) in
the intervals vai , vmi , v
−
i , v
+
i for every i ∈ [r]. Since the length of each of those intervals is 1, each such
cut encodes a number in [0, 1]. Consider vi, the output-node of gate gi with inputs vj , vk. Think of the
agents adi, midi, ceni, exi as being sequential, meaning that each of them “computes” a value through
a cut in vai , vmi , v
−
i or v
+
i respectively, and feeds it in the next agent. In particular, agent adi takes as
input the values (in the form of cuts) that nodes vj , vk give her, and computes the exact operation that
gi prescribes (e.g. if gi is type G
[0,1]
− , adi performs subtraction of the input values without capping at 0).
Then adi feeds this value in midi via creating a cut in vai , and midi computes the actual value in [0, 1]
that gi should output (e.g. if gi is type G
[0,1]
− , in this step midi caps the value at 0), and feeds it in ceni via
creating a cut in vmi . This correct value should be exported for further use from other gates to which vi is
input, but depending on these gates, the positive or negative of that value might be needed (by “positive”
and “negative” we mean the label, not the actual sign of the value). That is why a negative version of this
value is produced by ceni and a positive by exi, via a cut in v−i and v
+
i respectively. A negative(resp.
positive) value is one encoded by a cut that defines an interval at its left which is negative(resp positive).
Moreover, for every input-node vj we arbitrarily consider adj to encode a negative value, and since (by
the structure of the Consensus Halving instance) the labels of the values induced by the 4 agents are
alternating, always ceni(resp. exi) encodes a negative(resp. positive) value.
F.2 1-1 correspondence of circuit values to Consensus Halving cuts
Let us define the functions zi(x), i ∈ [r] that depend on the input vector x ∈ [0, 1]N , and compute the
value of each node vi of the arithmetic circuit H. Let us also arbitrarily set (z1, . . . , zN ) := (x1, . . . , xN ).
First, we will show that for every tuple (z1(x), . . . , zr(x)) of values that satisfy H, a solution in the
constructed Consensus Halving instance with n agents and n cuts (n := 4r) encodes the same values
via its cuts. We will then show that for every solution of the Consensus Halving instance with n agents
and n cuts, the cuts correspond to a unique tuple (z1, . . . , zr) that satisfies H. In the sequel, we call a
cut t negative(resp. positive) if the interval that it defines at its left has negative(resp. positive) label.
Without loss of generality, let the interval at the left of the first cut to be a negative interval.
Circuit values to cuts Suppose the tuple (z∗1 , . . . , z∗r ) satisfies H. We will show that from this solution
we can create a Consensus Halving solution with n := 4r cuts, i.e. all of the agents are satisfied.
Consider node vi of H. Let us translate the values z∗i , i ∈ [r] into cuts as follows:
– If gi’s type is one of Gζ , G∗ζ , G+, G()2 , G
[0,1]
∗2 or vi is an input-node.
• Place a cut at t = vai,l + z∗i ,
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• Place a cut at t = vmi,l + z∗i ,
• Place a cut at t = v−i,l + z∗i ,
• Place a cut at t = v+i,l + z∗i .
– If gi’s type is G
[0,1]
− , i.e. gi = max{gj − gk, 0}, and z∗j ≥ z∗k.
• Place a cut at t = vai,l + z∗i ,
• Place a cut at t = vmi,l + z∗i ,
• Place a cut at t = v−i,l + z∗i ,
• Place a cut at t = v+i,l + z∗i .
– If gi’s type is G
[0,1]
− , i.e. gi = max{gj − gk, 0}, and z∗j < z∗k
• Place a cut at t = vai,l − (z∗k − z∗j )/5,
• Place a cut at t = vmi,l + z∗i ,
• Place a cut at t = v−i,l + z∗i ,
• Place a cut at t = v+i,l + z∗i .
By construction of the valuation functions of the agents, these cuts are placed one after the other,
and therefore they alternate between “negative” and “positive”, starting with negative. Let us now prove
that for every i ∈ [r], the adi agent is satisfied.
Gζ : This gate has no input. Consider its output z∗i = ζ and its output-node vi. By our constructed
n-cut, a cut is placed at t = vai,l+ ζ, which cuts exactly in half the total valuation of adi in v
a
i (see Figure
1). Since the valuation function is symmetric around vai (see (1)), agent adi is satisfied.
G∗ζ : Consider its input z∗j , output z∗i = ζ · z∗j and its output-node vi. By our constructed n-cut, a
positive cut is placed at t = v+j,l + z
∗
j and a negative cut is placed at t = vai,l + z
∗
i . The valuation
function is symmetric around vai (see (1)), therefore, in order for adi to be satisfied, it suffices that
z∗j · 1 + (ζ − z∗i ) · 1ζ = (1− z∗j ) · 1 + z∗i · 1ζ , which is true.
G+ : Consider its inputs z∗j , z∗k, its output z
∗
i = z
∗
j +z
∗
k and its output-node vi. By our constructed n-cut,
a positive cut is placed at t = v+j,l + z
∗
j , another positive cut is placed at t = v
+
k,l + z
∗
k and a negative cut
is placed at t = vai,l + z
∗
i . The valuation function is symmetric around vai (see (1)), therefore, in order for
adi to be satisfied, it suffices that z∗j · 1+ z∗k · 1+ (1− z∗i ) · 1 = (1/2− z∗j ) · 1+ (1/2− z∗k) · 1+ z∗i · 1, which
is true.
G()2 : Consider its input z∗j , output z∗i = (z∗j )2 and its output-node vi. By our constructed n-cut, a
positive cut is placed at t = v+j,l + z
∗
j and a negative cut is placed at t = vai,l + z
∗
i . The valuation
function is symmetric around vai (see (1)), therefore, in order for adi to be satisfied, it suffices that
(z∗j )
2 + (1− z∗i ) · 1 = (1− (z∗j )2) + z∗i · 1, which is true.
G
[0,1]
∗2 : Consider its input z
∗
j , output z∗i = 2 · z∗j and its output-node vi. By our constructed n-cut,
a positive cut is placed at t = v+j,l + z
∗
j and a negative cut is placed at t = vai,l + z
∗
i . The valuation
function is symmetric around vai (see (1)), therefore, in order for adi to be satisfied, it suffices that
z∗j · 1 + (1− z∗i ) · 12 = (1/2− z∗j ) · 1 + z∗i · 12 , which is true.
G
[0,1]
− : Consider its inputs z∗j , z∗k, its output z
∗
i = max{z∗j − z∗k, 0} and its output-node vi. By our
constructed n-cut,
– if z∗j ≥ z∗k, then z∗i = z∗j − z∗k. By our constructed n-cut, a positive cut is placed at t = v+j,l + z∗j , a
negative cut is placed at t = v−k,l + z
∗
k and another negative cut is placed at t = v
a
i,l + z
∗
i . In order for
adi to be satisfied, it suffices that z∗j ·1+(1−z∗k) ·1+(1−z∗i ) ·1+4 = (1−z∗j ) ·1+z∗k ·1+(4+1)+z∗i ·1,
which is true.
– if z∗j < z∗k, then z
∗
i = 0. By our constructed n-cut, a positive cut is placed at t = v
+
j,l+z
∗
j , a negative cut
is placed at t = v−k,l+z
∗
k and another negative cut is placed at t = v
a
i,l−(z∗k−z∗j )/5. In order for adi to
be satisfied, it suffices that z∗j ·1+(1−z∗k)·1+
z∗k−z∗j
5 ·(4+1)+1+4 = (1−z∗j )·1+z∗k ·1+(1−
z∗k−z∗j
5 )·(4+1),
which is true.
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We will now prove that in our constructed n-cut, the agents midi, ceni, exi are also satisfied. If gi is
not a G[0,1]− gate, let us prove that midi is satisfied. In our n-cut there is a negative cut at t = vai,l + z
∗
i
and a positive one at t = vmi,l + z
∗
i . In order for midi to be satisfied, it suffices that z∗i · 1 + (1− z∗i ) · 1 =
(1− z∗i ) · 1 + z∗i · 1, which is true. The proof of satisfaction of agents midi, ceni, exi is similar, since the
succeeding agent’s valuation function is the same as the preceding agent’s one, shifted 3 units.
If gi is a G
[0,1]
− gate, let us prove that midi is satisfied.
– if z∗j ≥ z∗k, then a negative cut is placed at t = vai,l + z∗i , and a positive cut is placed at t = vmi,l + z∗i .
In order for midi to be satisfied, it suffices that z∗i · 1+ (1− z∗i ) · 1 = (1− z∗i ) · 1+ z∗i · 1, which is true.
– if z∗j < z∗k, then a negative cut is placed at t = v
a
i,l−(z∗k−z∗j )/5 and a positive cut is placed at t = vmi,l.
In order for midi to be satisfied, it suffices that
z∗k−z∗j
5 · 0 + 1 · 1 = 1 · 1, which is true.
For the agents ceni and exi, it is easy to see that due to their valuation functions, the n-cut we provide
forces them to have positive total valuation equal to the negative one.
Cuts to circuit values Now suppose that the tuple (t∗1, . . . , t∗n) with 0 ≤ t∗1 ≤ · · · ≤ t∗n ≤ 12r, represents
an n-cut (n := 4r) that is a solution of the constructed Consensus Halving instance with n agents,
where w.l.o.g. the first 4N cuts correspond to the N input-nodes. We will show that from this solution
we can construct a tuple (z1, . . . , zr) that satisfies the circuit H.
Consider node vi which is the output-node of gate gi or it is an input-node. Observe that the valuation
function of each of adi,midi, ceni and exi has more than half of her total valuation inside the interval
[bi, bi + 3], [bi + 3, bi + 6], [bi + 6, bi + 9] and [bi + 9, bi + 12] respectively. This means that in a solution,
each of them has to have at least one cut in her corresponding aforementioned interval. But since these
intervals are not overlapping for all n agents, and we need to have at most n cuts, exactly one cut has to
be placed by each agent in her corresponding interval.
Consider now the first 4N cuts that correspond to the input-nodes. As it is apparent from the definition
of these nodes’ valuation functions, each agent of adi,midi, ceni, exi for i ∈ [N ] has to place her single
cut in the interval vai , vmi , v
−
i , v
+
i respectively. Given the latter fact, the definition of valuation functions
for non input-node agents dictates that there will always be a cut in v+i for every i ∈ [r]. Since 0 ≤ t∗1 ≤
· · · ≤ t∗n ≤ 12r, the sequential nature of our agents indicates that the cut t∗4i, i.e. with index 4 · i, is found
in interval v+i . Now, let us translate the position of the cut t
∗
4i, i ∈ [r] into the value zi = t∗4i − v+i,l. By a
similar argument as that of the previous paragraph showing that the adi agents are satisfied, it is easy
to see that, by the aforementioned translation, the created tuple (z1, . . . , zr) satisfies circuit H.
Valuation functions to circuits In the Consensus Halving instances we construct, we have de-
scribed the valuation functions of the agents mathematically. However, in a Consensus Halving in-
stance the input is an arithmetic circuit, therefore we have to turn each valuation function of each agent
j ∈ [n] into an arithmetic circuit. Here we describe a method to do that.
These functions, as we showed, are piecewise linear, or piecewise quadratic, with k pieces, where
k is constant. Consider the valuation function f of an arbitrary player. Let the pieces of f be
[p0, p1), [p1, p2), . . . , [pk−1, pk] where p0 = 0 and pk = 1 and denote P1, P2, . . . , Pk the above pieces
respectively. Let us also denote by fPs the polynomial in interval Ps, s ∈ {1, 2, . . . , k}. In particular, f
can be defined as
f(t) =

fP1(t) , t ∈ [p0, p1)
fP2(t) , t ∈ [p1, p2)
...
fPk(t) , t ∈ [pk−1, pk],
(2)
where fPs(t) equals either a constant cs ≥ 0, or it equals cs · (t − ps−1). (The latter comes from the
valuation function of an ad agent that corresponds to an output node of a G()2 gate.)
For each of these pieces let us find the interval of fPs(t), and denote it by FPs(t), i.e.
FPs(t) := FPs−1(ps−1) +
∫ t
ps−1
fPs(τ)dτ,
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where FP0(t) := 0. By the above equation, in case fPs(t) = cs, it is FPs(t) = FPs−1(ps−1) + cs(t− ps−1)
and in case fPs(t) = cs · (t− ps−1), it is FPs(t) = FPs−1(ps−1) + cs2 (t− ps−1)2 .
Let us now denote by Ws(t), s ∈ [k] some sub-functions to be defined below, where W0 := 0.
– If fPs(t) = cs and fPs+1(t) = cs+1:
• If cs ≤ cs+1: Ws+1 := max{Ws, FPs+1(t)}.
• If cs > cs+1: Ws+1 := min{Ws, FPs+1(t)}.
– If fPs(t) = cs · (t−ps−1) then, by construction of our Consensus Halving instance, fPs−1(t) = cs−1
and fPs+1(t) = cs+1, and:
• Ws := min{Ws−1, FPs(t)}.
• Ws+1 := max{Ws, FPs+1(t)}.
For each player with some function f as defined above, we can compute the functions FPs , s ∈ [k] by
using gates Gζ , G+, G−, G∗ of an arithmetic circuit. Then, by checking the above cases, we can construct
the functionWk(t), t ∈ [0, 12r] that computes the cumulative value of the player at point t, by using Gmax
and Gmin gates. Therefore, the arithmetic circuits of the functions Wk(t) (one for each agent j ∈ [n])
constitute a proper Consensus Halving instance.
G Proof of Theorem 11
In [25] it is shown that the problem of finding a Nash equilibrium of a d-player normal form game
with d ≥ 3 (“d-player Nash equilibrium” problem) is FIXP-complete. Given an instance of this problem,
we will construct a polynomial-time reduction to (n, n)-Consensus Halving. We will start from an
arbitrary instance of “d-player Nash equilibrium” and, according to it, design a circuit using only the
gates Gζ , G+, G−, G∗, Gmax, Gmin with ζ ∈ Q. This step is done by a straightforward application of the
procedure described in the proofs of Lemma 4.5 and Lemma 4.6 in [25]. This circuit computes a function
whose fixed points correspond precisely to the Nash equilibria of the initial game. Then, we create an
equivalent circuit by “breaking down” the initial gates to some more suitable ones (by introducing “special
gates”, see Table 2), whose inputs and outputs are guaranteed to be in [0, 1]. From this, we will create a
cyclic circuit, introduce consensus halving players on the “wires” of the circuit, and show that a consensus
halving solution with at most as many cuts as the number of players in this instance can be efficiently
translated back to a Nash equilibrium of the initial game.
G.1 Expressing the game as a circuit without division gates
Here, given an arbitrary d-player game, we will create a function whose fixed points are precisely the
Nash equilibria of that game. Consider a given instance I of the “d-player Nash equilibrium” problem,
i.e. a d-player normal form game where each player i has a set Si of pure strategies. We will use the
following notation similar to the one in [25]: Ni := |Si|, N :=
∑d
i Ni and vi is the payoff function of
player i with domain DI := ×di=1∆Ni , where ∆Ni is the unit (Ni − 1)-simplex. Define the mixed strategy
profile x := (x11, . . . , x1N1 , x21, . . . , x2N2 , . . . , xd1, . . . , xdNd) to be a N -dimensional vector with the entry
xij being the probability that player i ∈ [d] plays pure strategy j ∈ Si. Also, v(x) is an N -dimensional
vector with entries indexed as in x, with vij(x) := vi(j, x−i), the latter being the expected payoff of player
i when she plays the pure strategy j ∈ Si against the partial profile x−i of the rest of the players. The
payoff function of each player is normalized by a standard scaling in [0, 1] so that the Nash equilibria of
the game are precisely the same. Thus, vij(x) ∈ [0, 1]. Finally, let h(x) := x+ v(x).
Now, define for each player i the function fi,x(t) :=
∑
j∈Si max(hij(x)− t, 0) with parameter x. This
function is defined in R and it is continuous, piecewise linear, strictly decreasing with values from 0 to
+∞, thus there is a unique value ti ∈ R such that fi,x(ti) = 1. The required function whose set of fixed
points is identical to the set of Nash equilibria of instance I is GI(x)ij := max(hij(x)− ti, 0) for i ∈ [d],
j ∈ Si. The function GI takes as input the n-dimensional vector x and outputs an N -dimensional vector
GI(x) with entries defined as above. By definition of GI and choice of ti, it is
∑
j∈Si GI(x)ij = 1 for
every i ∈ [d], and therefore GI is a mapping of the domain DI to itself.
Lemma 18 (LEMMA 4.5, [25]). The fixed points of the function GI are precisely the Nash equilibria
of the game I.
In fact, the structure of function GI allows for it to be efficiently constructed using only the required
types of gates.
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Lemma 19 (LEMMA 4.6, [25]). We can construct in polynomial time a circuit with basis
{+,−, ∗,max,min} (no division) and rational constants that computes the function GI .
For the proofs of the above lemmata the reader is referred to the indicated work by Etessami and
Yannakakis.
In the proof of the latter lemma in [25] it is shown how to construct an arithmetic circuit CI that
computes the function GI using only gates of type Gζ , G+, G−, G∗, Gmax, Gmin, where ζ ∈ Q. The con-
struction of CI is the following: Compute the function y = h(x) = x + v(x) using only G+, G∗ type of
gates, allowed by the definition of v(x). Vector y has d sub-vectors, where yi = (yi1, yi2, . . . , yiNi). Then,
each yi is sorted using a sorting network Zi thus creating a vector zi = (zi1, zi2, . . . , ziNi) with sorted
entries zi1 ≥ zi2 ≥ · · · ≥ ziNi ; sorting networks can be implemented in arithmetic circuits using only gates
Gmax, Gmin (for more see e.g. [33]). Using zij ’s the function ti := maxl∈[Ni]
{
(1/l) ∗
((∑l
j=1 zij
)
− 1
)}
is computed and the final output of the whole circuit is
x′ij := max{yij − ti, 0} for each i ∈ [d], j ∈ Si. (3)
G.2 A circuit with gates whose inputs/outputs are in [0, 1]
One can easily observe that some of the gates of circuit CI may have inputs and outputs outside of [0, 1].
For example, the G+ gate that computes yij = xij + v(x)ij can be 2 and the arguments of Gmax in ti can
be negative. We will transform this circuit into an equivalent one that guarantees its gates’ inputs and
outputs to be in [0, 1], using only gates Gζ , G+, G
[0,1]
− , G∗, G
[0,1]
∗2 , Gmax, Gmin, where ζ ∈ Q∩ (0, 1], G[0,1]− is
a special subtraction gate that outputs 0 in case the subtraction results to a negative number, and G[0,1]∗2
is a special multiplication gate that multiplies a single input in [0, 12 ] with 2 and its output is in [0, 1].
In particular, instead of constructing the circuit CI as described in the previous paragraph, we will
construct an equivalent one, called C ′I , whose input and output are the same as that of CI , namely xij and
x′ij , i ∈ [d], j ∈ [Ni] respectively, but its gates have inputs/outputs in [0, 1]. We do this by manipulating
the formula for the required function GI under computation, by suitably scaling up or down the input
values of each gate, using additional gates Gζ , G+, G
[0,1]
− , G∗.
We construct C ′I as follows: First, we compute the vector p := h(x)/2 = x ∗ 12 + v(x) ∗ 12 using
only G+, G∗ gates. Note that xij , vij(x), pij ∈ [0, 1], ∀i ∈ [d], j ∈ Si (recall that the payoff function is
normalized in [0, 1]). Then, we sort each of the sub-vectors pi, i ∈ [d] via a sorting network Qi that can
be constructed using Gmax and Gmin gates, thus computing the sorted vectors qi = (qi1, qi2, . . . , qiNi)
with sorted entries qi1 ≥ qi2 ≥ · · · ≥ qiNi . Now, for every i ∈ [d] and l ∈ [Ni] we compute the following
sub-function
t′′il :=
1
2
∗ 1
l
∗
l∑
j=1
qij +
1
2
− 1
4
∗ 1
l
,
by using l+1 G+ gates, 3 G+ gates and 1 G
[0,1]
− gate, where the subtraction gate is the last to take place.
One should observe that since
∑Ni
j=1 xij = 1 and
∑Ni
j=1 vij(x) ≤ 1 (by definition of normalized payoff
function), it is
∑Ni
j=1 qij ≤ 12 · (1 + 1) = 1, therefore none of the individual computations of t′′il is outside
[0, 1]. Moreover, in the subtraction, the value of the subtrahend is at most the value of the minuend so
the subtraction is precise (not capped at 0).
Now, for each i ∈ [d] we compute the sub-function
t′′i := max
l∈[Ni]
{t′′il},
by using Ni − 1 Gmax gates, and consequently compute
t′i :=
(
t′′i −
1
2
)
∗ 2,
by using one G[0,1]− and one special G
[0,1]
∗2 gate and the computations happen from left to right. Note that
t′′i ≥ 1/2, therefore the subtraction is precise (not capped at 0). Also, note that, by definition of t′′il, it is
t′′i ≤ 1, therefore t′′i − 1/2 ≤ 1/2 and the output of the G[0,1]∗2 gate of t′i is in [0, 1]. Finally, the output of
the circuit C ′I is computed by
x′ij := max{pij − t′i, 0} ∗ 2, for each i ∈ [d], j ∈ Si, (4)
using one G[0,1]− and one special G
[0,1]
∗2 gate.
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Lemma 20. Circuit C ′I is equivalent to CI , i.e. it computes the function GI .
Proof. We will show that for every i ∈ [d], j ∈ Si, the value xij of (4) is the same as that of (3), i.e.
the output of the circuits C ′I and CI is the exact same. Using the formulas for t
′′
il, t
′′
i and t′i, we can
re-write algebraically xij by substituting the circuit’s operations with the regular mathematical ones,
i.e. G+, G
[0,1]
− , G
[0,1]
∗2 , G∗, Gmax, Gmin translate to +,−, ·2, ·,max,min respectively. Observe that this is
possible since the G[0,1]− gate, excluding the one in (4), actually performs subtraction without capping the
output to 0. Thus, starting from (4) we have
x′ij = max{pij − t′i, 0} · 2
= max{2 · pij − 2 · t′i, 0}
= max
{
yij − 4 ·
(
t′′i −
1
2
)
, 0
}
(yij from construction of CI)
= max
{
yij − 4 ·
(
max
l∈[Ni]
{t′′il} −
1
2
)
, 0
}
= max
yij − 4 ·
max
l∈[Ni]
 12l ·
 l∑
j=1
qij
+ 1
2
− 1
4l
− 12
 , 0

= max
yij − 4 · maxl∈[Ni]
 12l ·
 l∑
j=1
qij
− 1
4l
 , 0

= max
yij − maxl∈[Ni]
1l ·
 l∑
j=1
2 · qij
− 1
l
 , 0

= max
yij − maxl∈[Ni]
1l ·
 l∑
j=1
zij
− 1
 , 0
 (zij from construction of CI)
= max {yij − ti, 0} (ti from construction of CI),
which is by definition equal to the output x′ij of (3). uunionsq
The circuit C ′I we constructed that computes the function GI uses gates of type in the set
{Gζ , G+, G∗, Gmax, Gmin, G[0,1]− , G[0,1]∗2 }, where ζ ∈ Q ∩ (0, 1].
G.3 The (n, n)-Consensus Halving instance
At this point we are ready to construct the (n, n)-Consensus Halving instance. The final circuit C ′I
computes the function GI , where GI : DI → DI , whose fixed points are precisely the Nash equilibria of
the initial instance I of the d-player game, due to Lemma 18. The output of C ′I is the N -dimensional
vector x′ with entries x′ij computed from (4). Let us close the circuit by connecting the output x′ij with
the input xij for every i ∈ [d], j ∈ Si. This new circuit, called CoI , is cyclic, meaning that it has no input
and no output.
The cyclic circuit CoI (like C
′
I) uses only gates in {Gζ , G+, G∗, Gmax, Gmin, G[0,1]− , G[0,1]∗2 }, where ζ ∈
Q ∩ (0, 1]. In Section 5.1 we describe how to turn such circuits into Consensus Halving instances.
Suppose that CoI uses l gates. Then, by the procedure of Section 5.1 let us turn C
o
I into a special circuit
Co
′
I with r = linear(l) gates which uses only the required gates by Lemma 10. Finally, still following that
procedure, let us turn Co
′
I into a Consensus Halving instance with n := 4r agents.
We can now prove Theorem 11
Proof. In Appendix F it was proven that a solution to the above (n, n)-Consensus Halving instance,
i.e. a solution with n cuts, in linear time can be translated back to a tuple z∗ := (z∗1 , z∗2 , . . . , z∗r ) of
satisfying values for the nodes of Co
′
I . Recall that C
o′
I was created by another cyclic equivalent circuit C
o
I
which was also created by merging the input and output nodes of an acyclic circuit C ′I .
Let us denote by v1, v2, . . . , vN and v′1, v′2, . . . , v′N the input and output nodes respectively of C
′
I and
denote by V1, V2, . . . , VN the merged nodes in CoI and C
o′
I . Let us denote by x
∗ := (x∗1, x
∗
2, . . . , x
∗
N ) the
N entries of z∗ that correspond to the values of nodes (V1, V2, . . . , VN ). Since the procedure in Section
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5.1 which turns CoI into C
o′
I preserves the computation of the values of V1, V2, . . . , VN , it follows that x
∗
satisfies CoI . Consequently, if the values x
∗ are copied as values of both input (v1, v2, . . . , vN ) and output
(v′1, v
′
2, . . . , v
′
N ) nodes of C
′
I then C
′
I is satisfied, since these nodes of C
′
I compute the same values as those
that V1, V2, . . . , VN compute in CoI .
As it was shown in Lemma 20, the output of C ′I computes the same output as CI , which computes
the function GI . Thus, for x∗ it holds that GI(x∗) = x∗, i.e. it is a fixed point of GI . Recall now
that the fixed points of GI are precisely the Nash equilibria of instance I of the initial “d-player Nash
equilibrium” problem. Since, due to [25], “d-player Nash equilibrium” is FIXP-complete, it follows that
(n, n)-Consensus Halving is FIXP-hard. uunionsq
H Proof of Lemma 14
Let us define the constrained version of ETR, denoted ETR[0,1], where the polynomials are over [0, 1]n
(while in ETR they are over Rn). It is easy to see that ETR[0,1] ⊆ ETR; an arbitrary ETR[0,1] instance
∃(X1, . . . , Xm) ∈ [0, 1]m ·Φ, where Φ is the ETR[0,1] formula, can be written as the following ETR instance
∃(X1, . . . , Xm) ∈ Rm · Φ
∧m
i=1 ((Xi ≥ 0) ∧ (Xi ≤ 1)).
We present a polynomial-time reduction from the ETR-complete problem Feasible to an interme-
diate problem Conjuction[0,1], which belongs to ETR[0,1], thus showing that ETR[0,1] = ETR. Then we
reduce a typical complete problem of ETR[0,1] to another intermediate problem called Feasible[0,1], and
finally we reduce the latter to (n, n− 1)-Consensus Halving, thus showing that the latter is ETR-hard.
A straightforward corollary is that Conjuction[0,1] and Feasible[0,1] are ETR-complete, results that,
together with the equivalence of classes ETR[0,1] = ETR, we believe are of independent interest.
H.1 ETR[0,1] = ETR
In this section we prove that ETR ⊆ ETR[0,1], hence ETR[0,1] = ETR. To this end, we present a polynomial
time reduction from Feasible to Conjuction[0,1]. Let us first define the problem Conjuction[0,1].
Definition 21 (Conjuction[0,1]). Let p1, . . . , pk : [0, 1]n → R be a family of polynomials, where each
one of them is given as a sum of monomials with integer coefficients. Conjuction[0,1] asks whether the
polynomials have a common zero.
Suppose we are asked to decide an arbitrary instance (∃X ∈ Rn) (p(X) = 0) of Feasible. We wish
to map every X ∈ Rn to a Y ∈ [0, 1]n so that there is a solution Y ∗ ∈ [0, 1]n if and only if there exists a
solution X∗ ∈ Rn. To this end, we will need the following result by Schaefer and Štefanckovič [42]. We
borrow their terminology and by (bit-)complexity of a semi-algebraic set we call the shortest length of
any formula defining the set.
Proposition 22 ([42]). If a bounded semi-algebraic set in Rn has complexity at most L ≥ 5n, then all
its points have distance at most 22
L+5
from the origin.
The above proposition implies that if Xi is in a solution of Feasible then |Xi| is upper bounded by
22
L+5
. Therefore, there is no need to map all real numbers to [0, 1], just the interval
[
−22L+5 , 22L+5
]
. So,
we will use the linear function
x(y) := 22
L+5 · (2 · y − 1), y ∈ [0, 1] (5)
in order to scale the solutions of p(X) in [0, 1]n, (see Figure 4). First, we need to create the number 22
L+5
or the number 2−2
L+5
. These numbers have exponential in the input bit-representation, that is why we
will use the trick of “repeated squaring” to create the required number by introducing auxiliary variables
which we repeatedly square L + 5 times. Since we need our variables to be in [0, 1], we will create the
number 2−2
L+5
, and we do this by introducing the variables S1, . . . , SL+6 and including the following
conjunctions in our formula:
(2 · S1 = 1) ∧
(
S2 = (S1)
2
)
. . . ∧ (SL+6 = (SL+5)2) .
Now, using (5), we have
Xi · SL+6 = 2 · Yi − 1,
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Fig. 4. Function x(y) = 22
L+5 · (2 · y − 1).
where we have introduced a tuple of variables Y := (Y1, . . . , Yn) ∈ [0, 1]n.
In order to make the substitution of variables, we multiply the given equation p(X) = 0 with (SL+6)
d,
where d :=
∑n
i=1 di and di is the maximum degree of Xi in p(X). Subsequently, in the new equation we
substitute each product SL+6 ·Xi with 2 · Yi − 1, and we get a polynomial equation q(Y ) = 0.
Eventually, the instance of the problem Conjuction[0,1] that we create is
(∃Y, S ∈ [0, 1]n+L+6) (q(Y ) = 0) ∧ (2 · S1 = 1) L+6∧
j=2
(
Sj = (Sj−1)2
)
,
where we denote by S the tuple (S1, . . . , SL+6) and L is the total complexity of the initial Feasible
instance. Note that the above instance has a solution if and only if the initial instance of Feasible has
one. In fact, the stronger property holds that we can get any solution X from a solution Y in polynomial
time, through (5), although this property is not necessary for our reduction since we are dealing with
“yes/no problems”. Also, note that the complexity of the new formula is at most O(L2)+O(L+6) = O(L2).
Hence, we have proven that ETR ⊆ ETR[0,1]. Since ETR[0,1] ⊆ ETR the following theorem follows:
Theorem 23. ETR[0,1] = ETR.
H.2 Feasible[0,1] is ETR-complete
We will show that Feasible[0,1] is ETR[0,1]-complete, so it is ETR-complete according to Theorem 23.
Clearly, Feasible[0,1] is in ETR[0,1], since it is a special case of a problem in ETR with constrained variables
in [0, 1]n where the boolean formula consists only of a single equation. We will now show that any problem
in ETR[0,1] can be reduced to a Feasible[0,1] instance.
Suppose we are asked to decide an arbitrary existential sentence of ETR[0,1]:
(∃(X1, . . . , Xn) ∈ [0, 1]n)Φ (6)
where Φ is a boolean formula with atoms Φi := fi  0 where each fi, i ∈ [m] is a polynomial function of
X1, . . . , Xn written in the standard form (a sum of monomials with integer coefficients) and  ∈ {≤, >}.
This is without loss of generality, since we can turn every equality to a conjunction of two inequalities,
and also, we can always move all monomials of an inequality to the left or right side appropriately.
The formula Φ consists of atoms Φi, i ∈ [m] connected with ∧,∨ and ¬. Let us transform Φ in
polynomial time into its equivalent one without ¬, by employing De Morgan’s laws, and thus the negation
of an “≤-inequality” becomes an “>-inequality” and vice versa. As a first step, we would like to eliminate
all the ≤ and > symbols, so that our formula contains only atoms with =.
Consider an arbitrary atom fi ≤ 0. For brevity, in the following we will denote (X1, . . . , Xn) by X
and always imply that fi depends on X. The sentence
(∃X ∈ [0, 1]n) (fi ≤ 0)
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is equivalent to the following,
(∃X,Ri ∈ [0, 1]n+1)(fi + Ri
1−Ri = 0
)
, (7)
where an additional variable Ri is introduced. In an ETR formula division is not allowed, so in order to
eliminate the division operation, we further transform (7) to the equivalent(∃X,Ri ∈ [0, 1]n+1) (fi · (1−Ri) +Ri = 0) , (8)
where allowing Ri = 1 still does not allow fi > 0, since (8) has no solution for Ri = 1.
Now, consider an arbitrary atom fi > 0 of complexity L, i.e. the sentence
(∃X ∈ [0, 1]n) (fi > 0) (9)
We will use the following result by Schaefer and Štefankovič. We remind that by (bit-)complexity of a
semi-algebraic set we call the shortest length of any formula defining the set.
Proposition 24 ([42]). If two semi-algebraic sets in Rn each of complexity at most L ≥ 5n have positive
distance (for example, if they are disjoint and compact), then that distance is at least 2−2
L+5
.
According to the above Proposition, sentence (9) is equivalent to the following,
(∃X ∈ [0, 1]n)
(
fi ≥ 2−2L+5
)
, (10)
where, since the bit-length of 2−2
L+5
is exponential, we can create it using the “repeated squaring” trick.
That is we introduce L+ 6 more variables S1, . . . , SL+6 ∈ [0, 1] whose tuple we denote by S and add the
following conjunction of atoms in the formula:
(2 · S1 = 1)
∧ (S2 = (S1)2)
...
∧ (SL+6 = (SL+5)2) .
Then, (10) is equivalent to (∃X,S ∈ [0, 1]n+L+6) (SL+6 − fi ≤ 0) , (11)
which we know how to transform to an equality (see (8)). Therefore, by introducing a variable Ti, (11) is
equivalent to, (∃X,S, Ti ∈ [0, 1]n+L+7) ((SL+6 − fi) · (1− Ti) + Ti = 0) , (12)
Now our boolean formula consists of m atoms that are polynomials equal to 0. We will proceed using
the arsenal introduced in [35] where they prove a similar result for the unconstrained ETR case. First,
let us introduce an additional “boolean” variable Wi, i ∈ [m], one for each atom, with value 1 if the atom
initially had ≤, and 0 if the atom initially had >. That is, for an arbitrary atom i, one of (8) or (12)
is true. So, we can add in our formula the following sub-formula and the conjunction of them for every
i ∈ [m]:
((fi · (1−Ri) +Ri = 0) ∧ (1−Wi = 0))
∨ (((SL+6 − fi) · (1− Ti) + Ti = 0) ∧ (Wi = 0)) . (13)
Next, we will eliminate the ∨ and ∧ operators using the following trick: (p = 0)∨ (q = 0) is equivalent
to p · q = 0 and (p = 0) ∧ (q = 0) is equivalent to p2 + q2 = 0. We will start from the latter conjunction
of sub-formulas. For every sub-formula i ∈ [m], as in (13), we have a single polynomial hi = 0, where
hi :=
(
(fi · (1−Ri) +Ri)2 + (1−Wi)
)
·
(
((SL+6 − fi) · (1− Ti) + Ti)2 +Wi
)
,
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thus replacing the conjunction of sub-formulas as in (13) with
∧m
i=1(hi = 0). Note that we have not
squared (1−Wi) and Wi because we know they are in [0, 1]. Now, let us substitute the initial formula Φ
(after removing the ¬ operators) with its equivalent, using Wi’s. That is, if the i-th atom of the initial
formula is a “≤-inequality” we substitute it with the atom (1 −Wi = 0), and if it is a “>-inequality”
we substitute it with the atom (Wi = 0). Therefore, we can now apply the aforementioned trick of
multiplication to eliminate the ∨ operators and thus have a formula with just ∧, i.e.
m′∧
i=1
(gi = 0),
where m′ ≤ m is the number of atoms in the resulting formula that represents Φ.
The whole formula, that is, together with the sub-formulas for the “boolean” variables is
m′∧
i=1
(gi = 0)
m∧
i=1
(hi = 0).
What is left is to transform this into a single polynomial using the trick of sum of squares (squares are
not needed for gi’s because our polynomials are in [0,1]),
m′∑
i=1
gi +
m∑
i=1
h2i = 0.
Let us denote by W the tuple of “boolean variables” (W1, . . . ,Wm) ∈ [0, 1]m, and similarly, R :=
(R1, . . . , Rm) ∈ [0, 1]m and T := (T1, . . . , Tm) ∈ [0, 1]m. Then the existential sentence that we have
to decide is
(∃X,R, S, T ∈ [0, 1]n+2m+L+6)
 m′∑
i=1
gi +
m∑
i=1
h2i = 0
 , (14)
where L is the maximum complexity of an “>-inequality” in Φ. Since the number of atoms m of Φ is at
most twice the total complexity L′ of Φ (because we substituted each equation with two inequalities), the
number of variables is O(L′). Also, since m′ ≤ m and the complexity of hi is at most 8 · 16 = 128 times
the complexity of the i-th atom in Φ, the complexity of the resulting formula of Feasible[0,1] is O(L′).
We have proven that the formulas (6) and (14) are equivalent. Therefore, one is true if and only if the
other is, hence Feasible[0,1] is ETR[0,1]-complete. Finally, from Theorem 23 we get that Feasible[0,1] is
ETR-complete.
I Proof of Theorem 15
As we show in Theorem 8, (n, k)-Consensus Halving is in ETR. In this section we prove that (n, n− 1)-
Consensus Halving is ETR-hard, implying that it is complete for ETR. This extends the results of [26],
where it was established that (n, n−1)-Consensus Halving is NP-hard even when a solution is required
to be 1/poly(n)-approximately correct, i.e. it allows that |Fi(A+)− Fi(A−)| ≤  for every agent i, where
 = 1/poly(n).
We present a polynomial time reduction from the ETR-complete problem Feasible[0,1] to (n, n− 1)-
Consensus Halving. Suppose we are asked to decide an arbitrary instance of Feasible[0,1], i.e. the
existential sentence (∃X ∈ [0, 1]N) (p(X) = 0), (15)
where X := (X1, . . . , XN ) ∈ [0, 1]N and p, is a polynomial function of X1, . . . , XN written in the standard
form (a sum of monomials with integer coefficients). Consider the positive integer coefficients C1, . . . , Cl
of p, where the number of terms of the polynomial is l. These coefficients are positive without loss of
generality, since we can replace a negative coefficient C that follows after a +(−) in the polynomial, with
−C that follows a −(+). Also, let us normalize the coefficients and create new ones c1, . . . , cl, where
cj :=
Cj
l · Cmax , j ∈ [l],
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where Cmax := maxj Cj . Note that our new polynomial q(X) which uses the new coefficients has exactly
the same roots as p(X). Also, note that cj ∈ (0, 1l ] for every j ∈ [l], a fact that will play an important
role at the last steps of our reduction.
Now, let us split polynomial q into two polynomials q1 and q2, such that
q(X) := q1(X)− q2(X),
and both q1 and q2 are sums of positive terms; l1 and l2 terms of q1 and q2 respectively, where l = l1+ l2.
In particular,
q1(X) :=
l1∑
j=1
rj(X),
q2(X) :=
l2∑
j=l1+1
rj(X),
where rj(X) := cj ·Xd1j1 · · · · ·XdNjN is the term j ∈ [l] and dij is the exponent of variable Xi, i ∈ [N ], in
the j-th term. Eventually, the existential sentence, equivalent to (15), that we ask to decide is(∃X ∈ [0, 1]N) (q1(X) = q2(X)).
Let us construct the algebraic circuit that takes as input the tuple X and computes the value of q1(X).
This circuit needs only to use gates in {Gζ , G+, G∗ζ , G∗, G()2}, where ζ ∈ Q ∩ (0, 1]. To see why, observe
that since every Xi ∈ [0, 1], i ∈ [N ], any multiplication between them by a G∗ gate is done properly
(the gate’s inputs/output are in [0, 1]), and obviously the same holds for G()2 . Also, note that due to our
downscaled coefficients cj , it is cj ≤ 1/2 for every j, and also
l1∑
j=1
rj(X) ≤ l1/l ≤ 1. (16)
Therefore, we guarantee that any of the l1 − 1 additions of the terms rj of q1 by a G+ gate is done
properly, (inputs in [0, 1/2] and output in [0, 1]). Similarly, we construct a circuit that computes q2.
Example Consider the following instance of Feasible[0,1]:(∃X := (X1, X2, X3) ∈ [0, 1]3)(p(X) = 0),
where p(X) := 6X31X2 − 4X22X23 −X1X43 + 8X2X23 + 3.
Let us create an equivalent existential sentence by replacing p(X) with the polynomial q(X), where
q(X) := p(X)40 , so(∃X := (X1, X2, X3) ∈ [0, 1]3)(q(X) = 0),
where q(X) :=
6
40
X31X2 −
4
40
X22X
2
3 −
1
40
X1X
4
3 +
8
40
X2X
2
3 +
3
40
.
We proceed by splitting q(X) into the following polynomials,
q1(X) :=
6
40
X31X2 +
8
40
X2X
2
3 +
3
40
q2(X) :=
4
40
X22X
2
3 +
1
40
X1X
4
3 .
The circuit that computes these polynomials is presented in Figure 5.
At this point we are ready to prove Theorem 15.
Proof. Let us construct a (n, n − 1)-Consensus Halving instance, where n is to be defined later. In
Subsection 5.1 we have shown how to construct an equivalent circuit to the one that computes q1, q2,
called “special circuit”, that
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G()2
G∗
G∗ 640 G∗ 840
G+
G+
G 3
40
G()2
r1 r2 r3
q1
G()2
G∗ 440 G∗ 140
G+
G()2
G()2
r4 r5
q2
X1 X3X2
G∗
G∗
G∗
G∗
Fig. 5. An example of the circuit that computes q1 and q2. Each G∗ gate that multiplies two variable inputs is
replaced by the structure shown in Figure 6.
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G+ G()2 G()2
G()2 G+
G−
G∗12 G∗12
a b
a · b
G∗
[0,1]
G∗2
[0,1]
Fig. 6. The internal components of G∗ (see Subsection 5.1 for the
mathematical formula that prescribes this transformation).
G+
q1
G+
q2
vr−1 vr
Fig. 7. The last two nodes of the special cir-
cuit.
– uses only gates Gζ , G+, G∗ζ , G()2 , G
[0,1]
− , G
[0,1]
∗2 ,
– every Gζ and G∗ζ has ζ ∈ Q ∩ (0, 1],
– for every input x ∈ [0, 1]N , all intermediate values computed by the circuit lie in [0, 1].
For the constraints of the above types of gates, see Tables 1, 2.
Let the number of gates in that special circuit be r := poly(N). Consider the last two nodes of the
special circuit whose outgoing edges are q1 and q2 respectively. Without loss of generality, we name them
vr−1 and vr (see Figure 7).
By Lemma 10 and the construction described in its proof (Appendix F), we embed the special circuit
in a Consensus Halving instance. This instance now consists of 4r agents, since to each node i ∈ [r]
correspond 4 agents: adi,midi, ceni and exi with valuation functions described by (1).
According to the embedding described in Appendix F, a tuple (z∗1 , . . . , z∗r ) of values that satisfies the
special circuit, corresponds to a (4r, 4r)-Consensus Halving solution, i.e. a tuple (t∗1, . . . , t∗4r) with 0 ≤
t∗1 ≤ · · · ≤ t∗4r ≤ 12r, of the Consensus Halving instance we constructed, and vice versa. As shown in
detail in Appendix F, a circuit every value z∗i in a solution can be translated to 4 cuts t∗4i−3, t∗4i−2, t∗4i−1, t∗4i
in the Consensus Halving solution by the transformation in paragraph Appendix F.2. Conversely, a
4-tuple (t∗4i−3, t∗4i−2, t∗4i−1, t∗4i) of cuts in a Consensus Halving solution can be translated to a single
value z∗i by the simple transformation z∗i = t∗4i − v+i,l in paragraph Appendix F.2.
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Let us now introduce a (4r+1)-st additional agent, named finis (from the Latin word for “end”) who
does not correspond to any node. The valuation function of this agent is non-zero only in the intervals
v+r−1 and v
−
r and, in particular is the following,
finis(t) =
{
1, t ∈ v+r−1 ∪ v−r
0, otherwise.
(17)
Eventually, the number of agents in the embedding is n := 4r + 1.
We will show that the answer to the arbitrary Feasible[0,1] instance (15) is “yes”, if and only if the
answer to the (n, n − 1) − Consensus Halving problem is “yes”, i.e. there exists a (n − 1)-cut that
satisfies n agents.
Suppose that there exists a solution X∗ := (X∗1 , . . . , X∗N ) ∈ [0, 1]N of (15), which equivalently means
that q1(X∗) = q2(X∗). Then, by the correct construction of our special circuit (following the procedure in
Subsection 5.1) which uses r gates and computes q1 and q2, there is a tuple z∗ := (z∗1 , . . . , z∗r ) that satisfies
it. Let, without loss of generality, (z∗1 , . . . , z∗N ) := (X
∗
1 , . . . , X
∗
N ). Then it holds that q1(z
∗
1 , . . . , z
∗
N ) =
q2(z
∗
1 , . . . , z
∗
N ), therefore z
∗
r−1 = z
∗
r .
According to the aforementioned translation to cuts, in the Consensus Halving instance there will
be a cut t∗4(r−1) = v
+
r−1,l + z
∗
r−1 in interval v
+
r−1 (i.e. a positive cut), and another one in t
∗
4r−1 = v
−
r,l + z
∗
r
in interval v−r (i.e. a negative cut). From the valuation function (17) of agent finis, we can see that her
positive total valuation equals her negative total valuation, since z∗r−1 ·1+(1−z∗r ) ·1 = (1−z∗r−1) ·1+z∗r ·1
holds from z∗r−1 = z∗r . Therefore finis is satisfied. Also, the agents adi,midi, ceni, exi for all i ∈ [r] are
satisfied as argued in Appendix F, and the answer to (n, n− 1)−Consensus Halving is “yes”, since we
have 4r + 1 agents satisfied by 4r cuts.
Suppose now that there exists a 4r-cut (t∗1, . . . , t∗4r) with 0 ≤ t∗1 ≤ · · · ≤ t∗4r ≤ 12r that is a solution of
the (n, n− 1)-Consensus Halving instance we constructed, where n := 4r+ 1. As argued in Appendix
F, if the adi,midi, ceni, exi agents for i ∈ [r] are satisfied then each of ceni, exi agents imposes a cut
in interval v−i and v
+
i respectively. The cuts in intervals v
+
i , for all i ∈ [r] can be translated back
to values z∗i , which successfully compute the values of the circuit, i.e. they satisfy the circuit. There
are also two interesting cuts t∗4(r−1) and t
∗
4r−1 imposed by exr−1 and cenr respectively which satisfy
agent finis. Since this agent is satisfied with no additional cut, it holds that z∗r−1 · 1 + (1 − z∗r ) · 1 =
(1−z∗r−1) ·1+z∗r ·1, or equivalently z∗r−1 = z∗r . Since z∗r−1 and z∗r correspond to the value of the circuit at
q1 and q2 respectively, for the circuit’s inputs (z∗1 , . . . , z∗N ) it holds that q1(z
∗
1 , . . . , z
∗
N ) = q2(z
∗
1 , . . . , z
∗
N ).
Equivalently, q(z∗1 , . . . , z∗N ) = 0, and equivalently p(z
∗
1 , . . . , z
∗
N ) = 0. Therefore, we have found values that
satisfy (15), and the answer to Feasible[0,1] is “yes”. uunionsq
J Proof of Lemma 16
Proof. Since each agent i has a polynomial valuation function, there is a d ∈ O(log n) and constants
a0, a1, . . . , al such that each function Fi can be written as Fi(t) =
∑d
j=0 aj · tj .
To prove the theorem, we will formulate the problem as an -ETR instance [20], and apply Theorem 2
of [20], which proves the claim. A problem Π ′ belongs in -ETR, if it is the relaxation of a problem Π in
ETR. More specifically, we get Π ′ by allowing a discrepancy of  > 0 in every constraint of Π. So, to get
an instance in -ETR for Consensus Halving.
We first write a simple ETR formula for consensus halving with polynomial valuation functions. If a
consensus halving instance has a solution, then it also has one in which the cuts are strictly alternating,
meaning that
Fi(A+) =
bn/2c∑
j=1
(
Fi(t2j)− Fi(t2j−1)
)
,
Fi(A−) =
dn/2e∑
j=1
(
Fi(t2j−1)− Fi(t2j−2)
)
,
where the cut is the tuple (t1, t2, . . . , tn), with 0 ≤ t1 ≤ · · · ≤ tn ≤ 1 and t0 := 0, tn+1 := 1.
In this encoding, we have no need to encode which set a particular cut belongs to, and so we can
encode a n-cut as an element of the n-simplex x := (x1, x2, . . . , xn+1) ∈ ∆n+1, where xi := ti − ti−1.
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From the latter, it is easy to see that
ti :=
i∑
j=1
xj . (18)
For j ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n}, let us denote by 1j and 0j a j-tuple of 1’s and 0’s respectively. Let us also define the
n-dimensional vector vj := (0j , 1n−j). Now observe that any n-cut t := (t1, t2, . . . , tn) can be represented
by a n-dimensional point which is in fact a convex combination of the n+ 1 vectors vj , j ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n}.
In particular, from (18) it is easy to see that
t := (t1, t2, . . . , tn) =
n+1∑
j=1
xj · vj−1.
Hence, we can encode the problem as an ETR formula
∃t ·
(
n∧
i=1
Fi(A+) = Fi(A−)
)
∧ t ∈ C,
where C is the convex hull of the vectors v0, v1, . . . , vn. This formula has n constraints, one for each
agent, and a single constraint bounding the variables in the convex set C which can be expressed by n+1
vectors, namely vj , j ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n}.
The main theorem of [20] allows us to leave the constraint t ∈ C unchanged, but insists that we
weaken the others. Specifically each constraint is weakened so that only Fi(A+) − Fi(A−) ≤  and
Fi(A+) − Fi(A−) ≥ − are enforced, which implies that |Fi(A+) − Fi(A−)| ≤ . This is sufficient to
encode an approximate solution to the problem.
The constructed -ETR instance has one vector-variable t ∈ C and 2n constraints. Let us now study
one of the constraints of the -ETR instance.
bn/2c∑
j=1
(
Fi(t2j)− Fi(t2j−1)
)− dn/2e∑
j=1
(
Fi(t2j−1)− Fi(t2j−2)
) ≤ .
Using the representation of Fi, we can write down a constraint as
∑d
k=0 ak · hk(t1, t2, . . . , tn) ≤ , where
hk(t1, t2, . . . , tn) is a sum of monomials, each one of degree d. Fi depends on t0 and tn+1 as well, but
recall that these are 0 and 1 respectively.
According to the notation of [20] (see also the full version [21] for details), the term ak ·hk(t1, t2, . . . , tn)
is a simple tensor multivariate polynomial with one variable of degree k, denoted STM(Hk, tk). Under
this notation Hk is a k-dimensional tensor where vector t is applied k times. Hence, every constraint is a
sum of d+1 simple tensor multivariate polynomials, i.e., according to [20] notation, a tensor multivariate
polynomial of maximum degree d and length d + 1. Furthermore, ||vj ||∞ ≤ 1 for all j ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n},
and for every constraint, the maximum absolute coefficient is constant by definition, and the degree d is
O(log n). Hence, we can apply Theorem 2 from [20] and get the claimed result. uunionsq
